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LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS
WITH the profession and the nation, the students of YALE LAW SCHOOL
mourn the death of Louis Dembitz Brandeis. A dominant figure in the
history of American law, for more than half a century he devoted an extra-
ordinary intellect and great energy to the cause of social justice on expanding
legal frontiers. As attorney for the people before federal and state bars and
then as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he
brought to the law a new vitality and realism. His work and character are
his memorial.
DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES IN CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION
ECONOMIC uncertainties of the past decade have accelerated the search
for uniform procedure and fixed concepts in the rehabilitation of debtor
corporations. Beginning with the enactment of Sections 771 and 77B2 of
1. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. §205 (1934). Section 77 was later amended
in important respects. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (Supp. 1939).
2. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. §207 (1934).
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the Bankruptcy Act, stimulated by the elaborate procedures established
in Chapters X 3 -and XI, 4 and climaxed by decisions of the Supreme
Court,5 significant results have been achieved. The recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Consolidated Rock Products Company v. DuBois0 in-
dicates that the basic outlines of the "fair, equitable and feasible" 7 plan of
reorganization have become settled and that the problems to be resolved
in the futLre by courts and commissions will be concerned with other aspects
of the reorganization process.
Reorganization new style marks the demise of the so-called "relative
priority" theory$ of participation in the assets of a debtor's estate and
adopts, at least as a matter of doctrinal profession, the "absolute priority"
rule.' To be fair and equitable under the latter concept, a plan of reor-
3. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 501-676 (Supp. 1939).
4. 52 STAT. 905 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 701-799 (Supp. 1939).
5. See especially Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941);
Securities & Exch. Comm. v. United States Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939) ; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U,
S. 106 (1939), (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1099; Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elect. Co., 306 U. S.
307 (1939).
6. 312 U. S. 510 (1941).
7. BANKRUPTCY ACT §§221(2), 366(3), 52 STAT. 897, 912 (1938), 11 U. S. C.
§§ 621(2), 766(3) (Supp. 1939). Cf. BANKRUPTCY ACT § 77(e) (1), 49 STAT. 918 (1935),
11 U. S. C. § 205(e) (1) (Supp. 1939). The Act will hereafter be cited only by section
number.
8. The relative priority theory (lid not require full compensation for the claims of
prior classes before junior interests were entitled to participate. Apparently the only
requirements were that bondholders be given new securities with a claim to a rate of income
approximately equal to that contained in the old bonds and with priority over new se-
curities issued in exchange for the old junior interests. See Bonbright and Bergerman,
Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganjixa-
tion (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 127, 131. Functionally, the relative priority theory meant
that greater emphasis was placed upon the bargaining process in fixing the provisions
of a proposed plan. The burden of loss in reorganization was shared by all classes, Little
emphasis was placed upon a precise valuation of the property, and courts tended to re-
gard the acceptance of the plan by the parties as largely conclusive upon the issue of its
fairness. See, e.g., Bonbright and Bergerman, supra; Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Re-
organization (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923; SEC REPORT ON TIHE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION
OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE ANo RFORGANI-
ZATION Co E xaI s (1940) Pt. VIII, pp. 148-53. [Hereinafter cited as SEC REroRT.
For examples of the application of the theory in the courts, see In re A. C. Hotel Co.,
93 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Downtown Investment Ass'n v. Boston Metropoli-
tan Buildings, Inc., 81 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
9. The absolute priority rule stems from Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.,S.
482 (1913). The validity and effect of its application to reorganizations under Section
77B and Chapter X have been indicated in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308
U. S. 106 (1939); Securities & Exch. Comm. v. United States Realty & Imp. Co,, 310
U. S. 434 (1940); Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941). Dis-
cussions of the rule in its present day context are found in SEC REroRT, (1940) Pt.
VIII, pp. 142-61; Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its hIt-
plications (1940) 53 HARV. L. REv. 713.
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ganization must not accord participation to junior interests unless such
interests are backed by an equity in the debtor's property after prior claims
have been satisfied in full.' 0 This rule must be observed between different
classes of creditors," betAveen creditors and stockholders, 12 and between
different classes of stock.' 3 It has been further emphasized that the absolute
priority rule applies whether the debtor is found to be solvent qr insolvent
at the time of reorganization,'14 and whether reorganization .,, a going
concern or liquidation is contemplated.' 5 But strict recognition of priorities
is subject to modification in one respect to insure fairness. Realizing that
adherence to the rule in all cases may lead to occasional injustice, the
Supreme Court has sanctioned the subordination of or limitation upon the
participating rights of senior interests where such interests have been respon-
sible for mismanaging the debtor' 0 or have engaged in other inequitable
conduct.' 7 Thus, needed flexibility in the operation of the rule has been
achieved for application in exceptional cases.
10. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939). Of course par-
ticipation may be accorded junior interests where they make a full monetary contribution
to the new enterprise. It has likewise been indicated that some provision for equity inter-
ests may be included in a plan where the strategic value of such interests as managers is
substantial. See Securities & Exch. Comm. v. United States Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U.
S. 434, 454 (1940). The standards applicable to this latter type of participatiun have
not been precisely formulated.
11. In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U. S. 24 (1936) (second and third mort-
gage noteholders eliminated) ; O'Connor v. Mills, 90 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A). loth, 1937)
(unsecured creditors eliminated).
12. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939); It: re Day &
Meyer, Murray & Young, Inc., 93 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Wayne United Gas
Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 91 F. (2d) 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937); Reading Hotel
Corp. v. Protective Committee, 89 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 3d, 1.937).
13. It re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 703 (N. D. I1. 1939); In re
Chicago, G. V. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149 (N. D. Ill. 1939); In re National Food Priad.
Corp., 23 F. Supp. 979 (D. Md. 1938); see FINLEr-ER, THE LAW OF BA,-xnC, rcy RE-
ORGANIZATION (1939) 417. But see In re Parker-Young Co., 15 F. Supp. 95, 971 (D.
N. H. 1936).
14. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 5-27 (1941); Sophian
v. Congress Realty Co., 98 F. (2d) 499, 502 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Price v. Spokane
Silver & Lead Co., 97 F. (2d) 237, 245 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); In re Barclay Park Corp.,
90 F. (2d) 595, 597-8 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S. E. C.
1, 22 (1940).
15. Adherence to the strict standards of the absolute priority rule has been insisted
upon even though liquidation rather than rehabilitation of the debtor property was in-
tended. In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Penn Timber
Co., 4 S. E. C. 630 (1939) ; Mortgage Guarantee Co., Corporate Reorganization Release
No. 37, February 11, 1941; Ulen & Co., Corporate Reorganization Release Nu. 43, June
21, 1941.
16. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elect. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939); In re Burns Bros.,
14 F. Supp. 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). The proposition was discussed but insufficient evi-
dence of mismanagement found to narrant subordination in Derby Gas'& Elect. Curp.,
Holding Company Act Release No. 2875, July 12, 1941, p. 15.
17. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939) ; Comment (1940) 49 Y.u L. J. 4SI.
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VALUATION AND THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
It has been predicted that adoption of the absolute priority rule will shift
the basic controversy in reorganization to the valuation placed upon the
debtor's property.18 Inasmuch as the claims of senior holders must be
satisfied in full before junior interests may participate in a plan, in cases
where the face amount of senior claims outstanding exceeds the value of
the debtor's assets no securities can be issued to the holders of inferior
claims having no equity.19 Consequently, in order to determine which classes
of claimants are entitled to an interest in the reorganized corporation, the
court is initially confronted with the problem of placing a value upon the
debtor's property. Overvaluation, with its probable consequence, over-
participation by junior interests, constitutes the most obvious device for
evading the strict requirements of the absolute priority rule. On the other
hand, an undervaluation would result in an elimination of junior interests
having value in terms of earning power, an act of foreclosure regarded as
indefensible in the tradition of the Boyd case.
20
An acceptable method for setting a monetary value upon property must
resolve these apparently conflicting interests and policies. The Supreme
Court recently held in the Consolidated Rock Products case2 that pros-
pective earning power is the proper determinant of value where rehabilitation
of the debtor as a going concern is contemplated. An analysis of the debtor's
future prospects in terms of earnings would likewise seem necessary in
order to determine whether the proceeding should terminate in rehabilita-
tion or in liquidation. 22 Where continued operation would diminish the
value of the corporation's total assets available for distribution, fairness to
creditors should compel present liquidation of the enterprise.23
In its advisory reports under Chapter X,24 the Securities and Exchange
Commission has uniformly followed the prospective earnings test of value, ''o
18. Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implleations
(1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 713; Comment (1940) 25 IOWA L. REv. 793.
19. See note 10 supra.
20. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
21. 312 U. S. 510, 525 (1941). The Court stated: "Findings as to the earning ca-
pacity of an enterprise are essential . . . for satisfaction of the absolute priority rule
• * * Unless meticulous regard for earning capacity be had, indefensible participation
of junior securities in plans of reorganization may result."
22. Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate Reorgani-ation (1939) 54 Q. J. EcoN.
28, 32. The author wisely suggests that the form a given reorganization proceeding ulti-
mately takes should depend upon economic considerations, namely, the value of the assets
in their present form as contrasted with their value in the dismembered state. A careful
comparison on this basis was made by the Commission in Porto Rican American Tobacco
Co., 7 S. E. C. 301 (1940).
23. Atlas Pipeline Corp., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 42, June 7, 1941.
24. Section 172 requires the reorganization judge to submit plans which he considers
worthy of consideration to the SEC for examination and report where the scheduled in-
debtedness of the debtor exceeds $3,000,000. Where the scheduled indebtedness is less,
the judge may in his discretion submit plans to the Commission. In both cases the
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except in cases where the debtor is not strictly an operating property.20
Recognizing that the projection of earnings into the future in a depression-
ridden, war-conscious economy22 is at best an uncertain undertaking, the
Commission has insisted upon a full marshalling of facts and figures before
rendering its advisory judgments.28 Foremost among the few constant factors
available to court or Commission is the past earnings record of the debtor.
The technique of valuation adopted by the SEC involves primarily the
adaptation of these past earnings20 to the corporation's future prospects. The
future trend of the industry as a whole with particular emphasis upon the
debtor's relative position, 0 the possibility of increased competition, foreign
or domestic, within the industry or from substituted products, 31 the trend
of price indices and income in particular areas,3 2 and the capacity of the
debtor's operating units33 are among the more important considerations. But
reports submitted by the SEC are advisory only. Under § 173, however, the judge may
not enter an order approving a plan until after the SEC has submitted its report if it
decides to do so.
25. The Higbee Co., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 39, March 25, 1941,
p. 10; Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7 S. E. C. 174, 181 (1940). The Commission has expressly
rejected reproduction cost new less depreciation as an adequate test. LaFrance Indus-
tries, 5 S. E. C. 917, 926 (1939) ; National Radiator Corp., 4 S. E. C. 690, 695 (1939).
Adoption of the capitalized earnings test of value accords with the views held by text
writers. See 2 BOTBRIGET, VALUATION OF PROPERY (1937) 870-93; DSWiNc, Tnn
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPO.ATIONS (3d ed. 1934) 140; FihnT-rrEr, TiE L.W OF BA^.K-
RTPTcY REORGANIZATION (1939) 557.
26. Penn Timber Co., 4 S. E. C. 630 (1939).
27. Little emphasis has been placed to date upon war conditions either by courts
or the Commission. An argument for a greater total capitalization based upon the pros-
pects of increased earnings due to a "war boom" was rejected in a district court case on
the ground that such booms are generally followed by periods of depression. See In re
Utilities Power & Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763, 770 (N. D. I1. 1939).
28. For examples of the thorough investigations undertaken by the SEC, see espe-
cially Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 7 S. E. C. 456 (1940) ; La France Industries,
5 S. E. C. 917 (1939).
29. In selecting its base period for computing average annual past earnings, the
SEC has perhaps shown an overly optimistic tendency. In the reorganization of La
France Industries, Incorporated, for example, it appeared that actual average earnings
before depreciation for the six year period from 1933 to 1938 were QS3,125 while the
"normal" average earnings for the same period adjusted for non-recurring items, were
$146,311. For the three year period from 1935 to 1938 actual average earnings vere
$95,539 and the adjusted earnings $174,397. The Commission selected the latter period
for determining future prospects. La France Industries, Inc., 5 S. E. C. 917 (1939).
Shorter base periods, however, have a tendency to discount changes in the business
cycle.
30. See The Higbee Co., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 39, March 25, 1941,
pp. 15-18; Atlas Pipeline Corp., Corporate Reorganization Release No: 42, June 7, 1941,
p. 10ff.
31. See La France Industries, 5 S. E. C. 917, 928-29 (1939).
32. See The Higbee Co., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 39, 'March 25, 1941,
pp. 15-17.
33. See Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 7 S. E. C. 456, 481-85 (1940) ; National
Radiator Corp., 4 S. E. C. 690, 692-93 (1939).
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a determination of earning capacity is also directly related to rates of depre-
ciation, prospective changes in operating expenses, possible savings from new
methods of operation, and the present condition of the debtor's plant and
equipment. Where properties are partially obsolete either from age or from
rapid technological advancement in the industry, the amount of money
required to place the debtor upon a competitive footing is an extremely im-
portant factor.34 In cases where the amount of new money required is dis-
proportionately high, liquidation of the enterprise may be preferable to
reorganization in solving its financial difficulties. 3
Once an informed estimate of the annual prospective earnings has been
made, the figure is capitalized at a rate consonant with the relative risk
involved in the continuation of such earnings.80 Generally, the rate adopted
by the SEC has been fixed at between 8% and 10%,37 but 12% has been
used where future earnings appeared likely to fluctuate widely.38 To the
base figure of capitalized prospective earnings is added the liquidation value
of non-operating properties or investments,"0 and any excess cash or working
capital which the debtor may have on hand.40 The resulting figure is the
going concern value ascribed to the debtor's property and constitutes its
permissible capitalization in reorganization. A vital element in the valua-
tion process, determination of the rate of capitalization nevertheless tends
to be arbitrary. No more precise a standard is available than the risk factor
of the particular enterprise, measured largely by its past experience and
the experiences of businesses similarly situated. But an adequate theory
of valuation not utilizing a capitalization rate has not yet been advanced.
Utilization of prospective earnings as the basic criterion of value has often
resulted in extreme reductions in total capitalization. Especially is this true
of corporations financed or expanded uneconomically with the optimism
characteristic of the late twenties. Investors holding unsecured claims and
equity interests in such enterprises have frequently been forced to write off
their investments as valueless. The recent reorganization of the San
34.' '1ee Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate Reorgani-atlon (1939) 54 Q. J.
EcoN. 28, 36.
35. See Atlas Pipeline Corp., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 42, June 7,
1941, pp. 22, 34; National Radiator Corp., 4 S. E. C. 690, 695 (1939).
",6. For a general discussion of the theory of capitalization adopted by the Conmims-
sion se DiVING, THF FINANCIAL POLICY OF CQRPORATIONs (3d ed. 1934) 144-51.
37. Calkins, Valuation in Corporate Reorganiz-ations (1940) 16 NomitE DAMC LAW-
vE 18, 27.
38. Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S. E. C. 1, 18 (1940).
39. For example, in McKesson and Robbins, Inc., Corporate Reorganization Release
No. 41, March 29, 1941, the debtor contemplated giving up its liquor retailing department,
Heiice the value of that portion of the debtor's business was not determined on the basis
of prospective earnings, but rather in terms of the amount realizable fron it on liquida-
tion. See also, Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 7 S. E. C. 456, 476 (1940).
40. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 41, March
29, 1941, pp. 8-9.
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Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Company 4 ' provides an illustration of this drastic
reduction in stated values and consequent elimination of worthless junior
claims. The corporation was organized in 1927 to construct and operate
a bridge across San Francisco Bay between San Mateo and Hayvard. It
was financed by the issuance of 6Y% first mortgage bonds, 75 debentures,
8% cumulative preferred shares, and common stock, a capital structure
reflecting the period in which the enterprise was incorporated. The bridge
was opened early in 1929. Predicted revenues failed to materialize in the
ensuing depression years. The completion in 1936 of the competing publicly-
owned bridge conrecting San Francisco with Oakland caused marked reduc-
tion in gross revenues. The debtor's total capitalization immediately prior
to reorganization was $9,882,374. A plan of reorganization was proposed
which contemplated a reduction in capitalization to $4,303,000 in income
bonds, 86,060 shares of Class A stock, and 2000 shares of Class B stock.
Under the plan the income bonds and the Class A stock were allocated to the
first mortgage bondholders and the Class B stock to the debenture holders.
The SEC, after analysis of past and prospective net earnings, determined
that the proposed plan still resulted in an overvaluation of the debtor's
property. The Commission further indicated that maximum capitalization
should not exceed $2,111,000, an amount insufficient to satisfy even the
principal claims of first mortgage bondholders. In view of its finding on
the valuation issue, the SEC condemned the plan as unfair to the first mort-
gage bondholders. The holders of the debentures, having no equity in the
enterprise, were not allowed to participate where the priorities of the senior
bondholders were not fully preserved.
A thorough analysis of prospective earning power is essential not only
in placing a fair valuation upon the enterprise as a whole but also in shaping
the security structure of the reorganized corporationA 3 It has been increas-
ingly recognized that in the interests of public policy corporations should
emerge from the reorganization process with a capital structure consistent
with the value of the property and the expected course of income.44 Plans
41. 6 S. E. C. 863 (1940).
42. In a later report, however, all parties admitted that there were assets of approni-
mately $53,000 free of the first mortgage. Consequently, the debenture holders were
accorded a slight participation. San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., Corporatg Reorgani-
zation Release No. 32, July 25, 1940.
43. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 525 (1941). The opinion
states: "Findings as to the earning capacity of an enterprise are essential to a deter-
mination of the feasibility as well as the fairness of a plan of reorganization. Whether
or not the earnings may reasonably be expected to meet the interest and dividend require-
ments of the new securities is a sine qua ino to a determination of the integrity and
practicability of the new capital structure."
44. See San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., 6 S. E. C. 863, 867 (1940); St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry. Reorganization, 240 I. C. C. 383, 399, 407 (1940); Gerdes, Gencral
Principles of Plans of Corporate Reorgani-ation (1940) 89 U. oF PA. 1. REV. 39, 41;
Fennell, Some Reflections on the Los Anqeles Lumber Company Case (1940) 29 GE.
L. J. 36, 50.
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of reorganization must satisfy the primary objective of feasibility 4" as well
as accord a fair and equitable participation to the various classes of claimants.
In order to be confirmed as feasible, a plan must equip a reorganized cor-
poration with a workable capital structure. 4" This demands not only that
total capitalization be set at a reasonable figure, but also that the various
types of securities issued contain provisions which are compatible with the
future earning prospects of the debtor. 47 The exemption of securities issued
in reorganization from prospectus and registration provisions of the Securities
Act 4 s and the general public interest in stable investments 40 would seem
to require rejection of plans not meeting the requirement; of sound finance.
The ratio of fixed charges to total capitalization must not be too great in
an industry faced with the prospects of relatively unstable earnings. III
many cases it may prove desirable to provide the debtor with a one-stock
plan. 50 In any event, an informed judgment on the propriety of a proposed
security structure cannot be rendered without an estimate of prospective
earnings. A capital structure formulated with reference to the expected
course of income will enable the debtoi- to procure adequate working capital
and to engage in future financing on favorable terms. It will also enable
corporate debtors to make adequate provision for maintaining their proper-
ties. Voting control will not be lodged in those having an interest of
negligible value in the debtor. Hence the danger that controlling interests
with a doubtful equity will force the enterprise to engage in speculative
transactions with little risk of loss to themselves will be minimized. And
most important, a conservative capital structure will render the need for
future resort to reorganization tribunals more remote.
The technique adopted by the SEC in utilizing prospective earning power
as the basic criterion of value has achieved sound results. Its financially
45. Sections 221(2) and 366(3) require as a prerequisite to confirmation that a plan
be found fair, equitable and feasible. No feasibility requirement is found in § 77(e) (1),
but substantially the same objective is indicated in greater detail in § 77(b) (4). For dis-
cussion of the feasibility requirement, see SEC REPORT, (1940) Pt. VIII pp. 159-61;
Gerdes, General Principles of Plans of Corporate Reorganization (1940) 89 U. or PA. L.
REv. 39, 41; Fennell, Some Reflections on the Los Angeles Lumber Company Case (1940)
29 GEo. L. J. 36, 50; Swanstrom, Stockholders' Participation its Reorganization (1939)
28 GEO. L. J. 336, 338.
46. Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat. Bank, 299 U. S. 18 (1936); Provident
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. University Evangelical Lutheran Church, 90 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A,
9th, 1937).
47. The problem of formulating a capital structure for a corporation in reorganiza-
tion is substantially the same as the 'problem of financing it initially. For a discussion
of the latter problem, see DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed.
1934) 312-28; Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganm'.ation;
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334, 1374 if.
48. Sections 264 and 393.
49. See San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., 6 S. E. C. 863, 867 (1940).
50. See Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S. E. C. 1, 27 (1940).
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expert appraisals should serve as models in reorganization proceedings where
no advisory reports are submitted by the Commission. It should be pointed
out, however, that the SEC reports under Chapter X are advisory in nature.51
Consequently, there is danger that the analyses prepared by the Commission
might be given insufficient weight by judges in exercising an informed,
independent judgment. For example, in the reorganization of the Deep
Rock Oil Corporation, the SEC submitted an advisory report in which it
concluded that the maximum capitalization of the enterprise based upon
going concern values should not exceed $7,150,000.52 The District Court
subsequently valued the debtor's property at $15,240,215, apparently basing
the figure upon reproduction cost appraisals made by the trustee.5 3 Under
the plan a funded debt in the form of notes bearing fixed interest was
provided in the amount of $5,500,000, a figure equal to 775 of the total
capitalization approved by the Commission. The SEC indicated in its ad-
visory report that, in view of the present condition and uncertain future
prospects of the corporation, a plan with no funded debt would be more
desirable although it could not be said with certainty that the proposed plan
was not feasible.54 A similar rejection of the Commission's figures occurred
in In re Reb Holding Compaiy,,55 a case involving the reorganization of an
apartment store and bijilding enterprise. Appraisals of the property varied
between $148,000 and $90,401.3 The latter figure was submitted by the
SEC as the going concern value based upon prospective earnings. The court
accepted $133,000 as the value of the property, rejecting the Commission's
figure.57 These cases indicate that the expert investigations undertaken by
the SEC may not accomplish their purpose if judges place greater weight
upon external factors or upon figures submitted by the parties. The im-
portance of having an expert, impartial agency exercise its judgment on
the issues of valuation and the new capital structure is significant. The
great number of variables involved in predicting future earnings might
51. Section 172. See note 24 supra.
52. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7 S. E. C. 174, 190 (1940).
53. See Standard Gas & Elect. Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F. (2d) 615, 616
(C. C. A. 10th, 1941). The findings of the lower court on the issue of valuation were
not contested in the Circuit Court of Appeals. The great disparity between the figures
of the Commission and the lower court may be explained in part by the fact that the case
had previously been before the Supreme Court which had apparently accepted a valuation
figure of $17,000,000 although not deciding its correctness. Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elect. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939). The SEC argued logically in its advisory report that
the figure accepted by the Supreme Court should be looked upon as setting only a rea-
sonable maximum.
54. See Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7 S. E. C. 174, 195 (1940).
55. 35 F. Supp. 716 (E. D. Wis. 1940).
56. Two appraisers appointed by the court placed a reproduction cost value less
depreciation on the property of $122,532, and a value based upon capitalized earnings of
$121,009. A prominent real estate man estimated the fair valuation at $148,000.
57. The court indicated that it did not regard earning power as the sole test of value.
In re Reb Holding Co., 35 F. Supp. 716, 717 (E. D. Wis. 1940).
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otherwise provide an avenue for the submission of exaggerated figures by.
the opposing parties in the hope that the inexpert judge will adopt an
attitude of compromise.58
In contrast with the method adopted by the SEC for valuing industrial
corporations, the Interstate Commerce Commission has not given sole con-
sideration to earning power in placing a valuation upon railroads for reor-
ganization purposes. 9 Although its criteria are not clearly defined in the
reports, apparently the ICC arrives at a total capitalization after considering
such factors as reproduction cost new less depreciation, book investment, the
physical value of the debtor's land, working capital, investments in affiliated
companies, and past and estimated future earnings capitalized generally at
a rate of 5%.6o The consideration of factors other than prospective income
58. The difficulties involved are illustrated in public utility valuation for rate-mak-
ing purposes where regulatory commissions, with the desire for low rates fostered by
political motives, are matched in the courts against companies seeking high rates. Judges
are usually forced to a compromise on the complex valuation issues.
59. See Comment (1941) 54 HARV. L. REv. 655. This is probably due in part to the
particular statutory sanctions under which the ICC operates. Section 77(e) provides,
inter alia, that the Commission, in order to approve a plan, must find that "It . . . is
fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of each class of creditors atd
stockholders, does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stock-
holders, and will conform to the requirements of the law of the land regarding the par-
ticipation of the various classes of creditors and stockholders; . . .The value of any
property used in railroad operation shall be determined on a basis which will give due
consideration to the earning power of the property, past, present, and prospective, and
all other relevant facts. In determining such value only such effect shall be given to the
present cost of reproduction new and less depreciation and original cost of the property,
and the actual investment therein, as may be required under the law of the land, in light
of its earning power and all other relevant facts." Thus, under these vague statutory
guides, earning power may be regarded as only one factor to be considered in deterniln-
ing value. The "law of the land" provision has been regarded as cautionary and not
as laying down a formula for determining value. The Supreme Court, in rate-nakihg
valuation cases, had overruled the ICC because of its failure to consider present repro-
duction cost as an element of value. It has been indicated that the drawing of the statute
in such vague generalities was to prevent the upsetting of Commission-made capitaliza-
tion figures in the courts by reference to valuation for rate-making purposes. Craven and
Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law (1936) 49 HAmv. L. Rv.
1254, 1274.
60. For example, in the New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorganization, 239 1. C. C.
337, 397 (1940), it appeared that a capitalization based upon capitalizable assets as
stated in the debtor's pro forma balance sheet would have amounted to $424,000,000.
Actual book investment in road and equipment would not have justified a capitalization
greater than $361,000,000. Cost of reproduction new less depreciation, plus land and In-
vestment in affiliated companies would have resulted in a maximum capitalization figure
of $368,764,809. Based solely upon earnings available for fixed charges, capitalized at
the rate of 5%, a capitalization of $267,773,480 would be produced. And based upon
capitalized adjusted income for the 1927-38 period, total capitalization would have been
$337,990,940. After considering all these "relevant" factors, the ICC concluded that a
total capitalization of not exceeding $365,000,000 was justified. See also Chicago, G. W.
R. R. Reorganization, 228 I. C. C. 585, 611-12 (1938) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Reorgani-
zation, 242 I. C. C. 298, 435-7 (1940).
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has resulted in maximum capitalization figures substantially higher than
those based solely upon capitalized earnings."1 The Commission's deter-
nuination of capitalization has been held conclusive on the courts in the
absence of a showing that improper standards were used or that its findings
were wholly unsupported by the evidence,62 even where the Commission
made no formal or precise statement of the grounds upon which its deter-
mination was based.0 3 Prospective earning power has been given greater
weight by the ICC, however, in shaping the security structure of the reor-
ganized railroad. 4 The amount and type of fixed charges permissible in
reorganization have been established with reference to predicted income.65
No reason is apparent why railroads should be treated differently from
industrial concerns in ascertaining the value of the property. The forthright
sanction of prospective earnings as the proper test of value in the Consoli-
dated Rock Products case0 G may have its greatest impact on future railroad
reorganizations. 7 Application of the straight earnings test to railroads would
normally involve drastic reductions in total capitalization. But the deter-
mination of fairness should be governed by the same standards applicable
to the reorganization of industrial concerns. Participation should not be
accorded junior interests if the going concern value of a railroad based upon
its earning power is not sufficient to meet the aggregate claims of senior
interests entitled to priority. Moreover, inflated capitalization figures may
encourage, as in industrial corporations, an overcapitalization through the
61. See Comment (1941) 54 HARv. L. Rmv. 655, 662.
62. In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 244 (N. D. Ohio 1940); In re Western P.
R. R., 34 F. Supp. 493, 504 (N. D. Cal. 1940). In other cases the courts have indicated
their acceptance of the ICC's figure wvithout determining its conclusiveness. See In re
Chicago, G. XV. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149, 160 (N. D. Ill. 1939) ; In re Chicago & X. NY.
Ry., 35 F. Supp. 230, 253 (N. D. Ill. 1940).
63. See In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237. 245 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
64. This is expressly required by statute. Section 77(b) (4) states that a plan of
reorganization "shall provide for fixed charges . . . in such an amount that, after due
consideration of the probable prospective earnings of the property in light of its earn-
ings, experience and all other relevant facts, there shall be adequate coverage of such
fixed charges by the probable earnings available for the payment thereof."
65. Railroad reorganizations have resulted in drastic reduction of fixed interest
securities and the substitution of income bonds and preferred stocks. See Chicago, RL I.
& P. Ry. Reorganization, 242 I. C. C. 293, 478-79 (1940); St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Reorganization, 240 I. C. C. 383, 444 (1940) ; Erie R. R. Reorganization, 239 I. C. C.
653, 744-45 (1940); Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Reorganization, 233 I. C. C. 515, 592
(1939).
66. See note 21 supra.
67. Aside from legislation amending Section 77 requiring the Commission to give
greater consideration to earning power in determining total capitalization, it w.'ould seem
that the courts could accomplish the same result under the present wording of the stat-
ute. If not based primarily upon earning power, ICC-approved plans might be set aside
on the ground that the law of the land required adherence to that test and hence the Com-
mission had applied improper standards in determining capitalizations.
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issuance of a disproportionately high ratio of debt securities to earning
power.
PARTICIPATION AND DISTRIBUTION
Until recently the cases dealing with fair plans were concerned mainly
with determining which classes of claims could be excluded from all par-
ticipation in reorganization.08 Now, however, attention has been directed
to the more pressing issue of determining the circumstances under which
prior claims will be regarded as so "fully compensated" to justify the par-
ticipation of the next junior class of claims. 9 The Boyd case itself declared
that until senior claims were fully compensated, such claimants were entitled
to every interest of value "whether it was present or prospective, for divi-
dends or only for purposes of control."7 0 But until lately there were few
guides for using this standard in the complex circumstances of most reor-
ganization cases.
The requirement that prior interests in a given reorganization receive
full value for their claims could be achieved most simply by a plan leaving
such interests undisturbed or by allocating to them exactly the same type
of security in the new corporation as they formerly held in the old. Thus
the holders of 6%, fixed interest, first mortgage bonds, maturing in 1950,
would receive for the full amount of their claims bonds containing the same
provisions. In practice, however, the preservation of identical priorities is
not possible except in certain cases where liquidation alone is contemplated."1
For a plan of reorganization, in addition to providing a fair and equitable
participation for the various classes of claimants, must satisfy the funda-
mental requirement of feasibility.72 The corporation must emerge from the
reorganization process with a capital structure adapted to its future ability
to earn. The requirement that a plan be feasible will normally necessitate
a reduction in fixed charges and hence some alteration in the rights and
privileges of security holders in the old corporation.73 This emphasis upon
feasibility thus appears to work at cross purposes with the rule that prior
68. See Krotinger, Management and Allocation of Voting Power in Corporate Re-
organizations (1941) 41 CoL L. REv. 646, 672. Discussion of the absolute priority rule
has likewise revolved largely around this aspect of its application. See Meck, Book Re-
view (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1255.
69. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941).
70. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 508 (1913); cf. Kansas City Ternm,
Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (1926); Louisville Trust Co. v. Louis-
ville, N. A. & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899).
71. See Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., 6 S. E. C. 699, 708-9 (1940). Preservation of
identical priorities without a precise determination of value was approved where the
objective of the proposed plan was liquidation. The SEC required, however, that the
characteristics of the new securities be clearly indicated.
72. See page 92 supra.
73. This is expressly authorized by statute. §§216(1), 77(b) (1) and (2).
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interests be absolutely preserved. But where more than one class of claimants
is entitled to participate, feasibility in capital structure may not be achieved
solely at the expense of the prior class and still satisfy the Supreme Court's
standards of fairness in distribution.74 The fair plan, however, does not
require the "absolute" preservation of priorities, but only that their -alue
be recognized in the exchange of securities. If priorities are paid for, they
need not be maintained.75
For purpose of discussing the distribution problem the types of fact situa-
tions generally arising in reorganization, which may occur singly or in
combinations, can be broadly categorized into three groups. The first and
least complex factual pattern is that of an insolvent corporation having one
class of creditors entitled to participate in the plan of reorganization. 70 In
cases of this type the problem of distribution is largely non-existent, assuming
the absence of grounds for equitable subordination or re-classification of
a portion of the claims, 7 7 since a single class of creditors will receive all the
securities in the resulting corporation, whatever their provisions. Although
a reduction in total capitalization based upon estimated going concern value
may result in the recognition and writing off of losses suffered by creditors,
they will share as a class in the securities and in profits of the new corpora-
tion. Hence the revised capital structure should normally consist of common
stock alone.78
The second type of fact situation, frequently encountered in railroad reor-
ganizations,7 9 arises where an insolvent debtor corporation has two or more
bond issues outstanding, each of which is secured by a mortgage of the same
rank on separate portions of the debtor's property. Where divisional mortgages
are secured by separate portions of a unified operating property and no
separate accounts have been maintained, 80 technical problems of valuation
and of distribution assume great complexity. The issues are somewhat less
difficult where the various properties have been operated as individual units
with separate accounting systems.8 1 In both types of cases, however, the
74. See Tellier v. Franks Laundry Co., 101 F. (2d) 561, 564 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939);
hI re Dutch Woodcraft Shops, 14 F. Supp. 467, 469 (W. D. Mich. 1935).
75. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 529 (1941); cf.
Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., 5 S. E. C. 72, 79 (1939).
76. See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 105 (1939).
77. See page 87 supra.
78. Of course, the necessity for attracting new money into the enterprise may in
some cases require a more complex security structure.
79. See Friendly and Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities in Railroad Rc-
organizations under Section 77 (1940) 7 L.w & Co.Taip. PFQB. 420, 427-34.
80. This is usually the case in railroad reorganizations where portions of the main
line have been mortgaged separately. See Denver & R. G. N. R. r. Reorganization,
233 I. C. C. 515, 533-36 (1939). Substantially the same situation e.isted in the Consoli-
dated case due to commingled assets and operation of the property as an integrated unit.
Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941).
81. This situation is well illustrated in Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 7 S. E. C.
456 (1940).
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initial determination involves valuation of the assets securing each bond issue.
The earning power attributable to the separate properties will probably be
accepted as the test for resolving this allocation. In cases where the individual
properties forming the separate security have been operated as units, an
estimate of their relative going concern values is obtained by the same method
as that adopted for the valuation of single corporate debtors.
82 In cases involv-
ing a unified operating property with divisional mortgages, however, some basis
for allocating values to the separate portions of the property must be found.
The ICC has answered this problem by so-called segregation formulae which
break down the revenues and operating expenses attributable to the various
mortgaged sections of a railroad. 3 Apparently this method will likewise
be adopted in the reorganization of similarly financed industrial concerns.
The Consolidated Rock Products case involved the reorganization of an in-
dustrial holding company and its two subsidiaries. Two issues of bonds were
outstanding, each secured by a mortgage on the assets of a different sub-
sidiary and guaranteed by the holding company. Subsequent to 1929 the
debtor corporations had been operated as a unit with a resulting com-
mingling of assets and, although some separate accounts had been kept, it
appeared that individual earnings records were not available for the two
subsidiaries. The plan of reorganization proposed a distribution of securities
and earnings between the bondholders of the two subsidiaries without a
separate valuation of the assets securing each issue. The trial court approved
the proposed allocation, finding it impossible to determine with any degree
of accuracy the properties originally belonging to the individual companies.
The Supreme Court condemned the failure to segregate values between the
two classes of secured creditors. Assuming that earnings records were not
available, the Court nevertheless indicated that "some appropriate formula
for at least an approximate ascertainment of their respective assets must
be designed in spite of the difficulties occasioned by the commingling. Other-
wise the issue of fairness . . . cannot be intelligently resolved.
'"8 4
Thus in a corporation financed by divisional mortgage bonds, the Con-
solidated Rock Products case implies that the basic criterion for valuing the
security of mortgaged properties will be their respective earning powers.
This is consistent with the accepted theory that the total capitalization of
a reorganized enterprise should be based upon prospective earnings. To
82. This was the method adopted by the SEC in Minnesota and Ontario Paper
Co., 7 S. E. C. 456, 476-525 (1940).
83. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Reorganization, 242 I. C. C. 298, 439-40 (1940) ; St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Reorganization, 240 I. C. C. 383, 410-11, 427 (1940) ; Erie
R. R. Reorganization, 239 I. C. C. 653, 676 (1940); Denver and R. G. W. R. R. Re-
organization, 233 I. C. C. 515, 534 (1939). This method is expressly mentioned in the
statute, § 77(c) (10) and (11). For a general discussion of the various methods used in
devising a formula, see Friendly and Tondel, The Relative Treatmnent of Sectriliesi hl
Railroad Reorganizations under Section 77 (1940) 7 LAW & CoNTMP. PRoD. 420, 427-34.
84. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 525 (1941).
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illustrate, suppose that a corporation operating as a unit is found to have
a going concern value of $1,500,000 and has two series of bonds outstanding
covering all of its assets, Series A and Series B, each series secured by
separate properties of the debtor. Suppose further that the total claim ,o
each series amounts to $1,000,000. The corporation is thus insolvent, its
value being insufficient by $500,000 to meet the $2,000,000 total claim 4d
the bondholders. Suppose also that an earnings segregation formula allo-
cates tvo-thirds of the prospective earning power of the corporation to the
properties securing the Series A bonds, and one-third to the properties
securing the Series B bonds. Under this analysis, the earning power back
of the Series A bonds would entitle them to a two-thirds participation in
the $1,500,000 total capitalization of the reorganized enterprise -that is, to
payment in full or $1,000,000 in the securities of the resulting corporation.
On this basis, the Series B bondholders would receive only one-half of their
total claim or $500,000. This distribution basis would logically follow even
if liquidation of the separate properties would realize only one-third for
the security behind the Series A bonds and two-thirds for the security
behind the Series B bonds. Once the possibility of liquidation is removed,
the participation of the two groups of bondholders should be determined
on a going concern basis.sa Hence it is doubtful whether a participation
of less than $1,000,000 for the Series A bonds in the case posed would
result in a fair and equitable scheme of distribution.80
Whether or not the valuation of security interests on a basis of respective
earning power will be accepted as fair in all cases involving divisional mort-
gage bonds remains a matter for conjecture. In the normal Case, where
the assets securing each bond issue are readily distinguishable, valuation on
an earning power basis probably accords with the understanding of investors
and hence with market operations. As the financial condition of a corpora-
tion becomes precarious, the market prices of divisional mortgage bonds
tend to reflect reorganization values. Investors look to the proportionate
earning power of the particular assets securing a given bond issue as measur-
ing its investment possibilities. This tendency has been apparent in market
transactions involving railroad divisional mortgage bonds. But an objection
may be raised against the uniform application of earnings segregation for-
mulze in all cases. Designing a proper formula to subsume the factual com-
plexity of commingled assets may prove extremely difficult. Where there
is a commingling, allocation of earning power to groups of assets becomes
85. See note 116 injra.
86. Where the earnings attributable to a division of a road are nw*re than sufficient
to meet interest requirements, the ICC has recugnized the strong position of bondholders
secured by a divisional mortgage on that section and has allocated to them first mortgage
fixed interest bonds for the full face amount of their claims. St. Louis-San Frandcco
Ry. Reorganization, 240 I. C. C. 383, 417-18 (1940) ; Denver & R. G. NV. R. R. Reorgani-
zation, 233 I. C. C. 515, 574 (1939).
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an artificial and arbitrary process. Moreover, where the debtor corporation
has operated as a unit with commingled assets for a prolonged period, the
market could not accurately reflect the earning power behind the assets
securing the separate bond issues. In such cases, investors may tend to place
primary emphasis upon the earning power of the enterprise as a whole,
rather than upon the earning power of an indeterminable portion of its
property. The market prices of such bonds, previous to the threat of reor-
ganization, would probably equalize, assuming that other bond provisions
were substantially identical, thus reflecting the unified status of the property.
Consequently, it may prove fairer to recognize this practical situation and
treat the two liens as prior claims against the property as a whole, allowing
a substantially equal division of assets and income between them. 7
The third type of fact situation involves the case where classes of claimants
differing in order of priority are entitled to participation. To simplify dis-
cussion, the solvent corporation will be regarded as illustrative. A solvent
corporation for purposes of reorganization is one having a going concern
value sufficient to meet the total claims of all creditors and leave an equity
remaining for distribution to the stockholders.88 The Consolidated Rock
Products case indicates that "full compensatory provision must be made for
the entire bundle of rights which the creditors surrender." 89 Under this rule
the Court held that accrued interest on bonds must be given the same
priority as the principal amounts due on such bonds.90 Similarly, other
possible sacrifices required of the bondholders in the interests of feasibility
- loss of the whole or a part of their security, loss of priority in access to
income, possible subordination to future creditors, reduction in interest rate,
extension of maturity dates, substitution of a contingent for a fixed return.
87. A variation of the pattern of competing mortgages is that of an insolvent cor-
poration with certain assets standing as security and others free of any liens. In this
type of case valuation of the free assets and of the security is normally required. Con-
solidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 520 (1941); Jamieson v. Watters,
91 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ; Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 7 S. E. C. 456,
515-17 (1940); see St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Reorganization, 240 I. C. C. 383, 424
(1940). Secured creditors are given a prior claim up to the value of their security. If
the security value is insufficient to satisfy the face amount of their claims, they have an
unsecured claim for the deficiency and may participate in the free assets on a parity
with general unsecured creditors. See FINLErrER, THE LAW oF BANKRUPTCy REORGANI-
ZATION (1939) 419; 2 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) § 615, This view
has been adopted by the SEC. See Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 7 S. E. C. 456,
531-32 (1940).
88. See, for example, Standard Gas & Elect. Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F.
(2d) 615 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
89. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 528 (1941).
90. Id. at 527. This view had previously been adopted by some lower federal courts
and by both the SEC and ICC. In re Barclay Park Corp., 90 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937) ; In re Chicago, G. W. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149, 161 (N. D. Ill. 1939) ; Flour Mills
of America, Inc., 7 S. E. C. 1, 20 n. 61 (1940) ; Missouri Pac. R. R. Reorganization,
239 I. C. C. 7, 116 (1940).
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elimination of sinking fund provisions, change from a creditor to a pro-
prietary position in the enterprise- must receive what will be accepted as
"adequate" compensation or the plan will be condemned as discriminatory."'
It can be argued that a reduction in interest rate results in no loss to the
bondholders in a deflationary period. Thus a new bond bearing a lower
interest rate might sell in the depressed money market, at the time of
reorganization, at the same price as the old bond bearing a higher interest
rate sold for originally during a period of higher prices. This argument has
been rejected, however, and bondholders held entitled to their full contract
rate or fair compensation therefor without regard to cyclical fluctuations
in the money market.92 Enforcement of contracts is the basis underlying
most rules of corporate reorganization. The fact that other concerns may
be presently able to finance on more favorable terms therefore has no bearing
on whether bondholders are receiving "fair" compensation for their con-
tractual claims. It can also be argued that an extension of bond maturity
will not weaken the creditor's position because he will receive additional
interest during the period of the extension. But it has been pointed out that
a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will be primarily interested
in getting his money and should not be deprived of that right in the interest
of junior holders unless by an adequate substitute.'2
The problem of precisely valuing and compensating for the particular
sacrifices of priority required of the bondholders in the interest of feasibility
is the basic determination, and obviously both difficult and misleading. Diffi-
cult because the value of the securities being exchanged cannot be compared
except with reference to the market, and that reference is specifically not
final. Misleading because in fact the slogan of "full compensation" sounds
as if priorities were being preserved, whereas priorities must necessarily
be sacrificed to the standards of financial feasibility. It is true that a reduc-
tion in interest rate can be expressed in monetary values by computing the
total interest which the bondholders would have received over the life of
the old issue and comparing it with the total interest to be received at the
lower rate under the new issue.94 And of course the sacrifice of unpaid
back interest is precisely expressed in dollars and cents. An extension of
maturity dates might similarly be valued by a process of discounting. But
other sacrifices, such as partial or total loss of security, substitution of a
proprietary for a creditor's interest in the enterprise, loss of prior access
to income, or the elimination of sinking fund obligations, are intangible
91. See the analysis made by the SEC in Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., 5 S. E. C.
72, 79-82 (1939). The Commission concluded that inadequate compensation had been
provided in the proposed plan for the substantial sacrifices required of the bondholders.
92. See Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7 S. E. C. 174, 195, n. 77 (1940); Flour Mills of
America, Inc., 7 S. E. C. 1, 20, n. 62 (1940).
93. See In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941, 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
94. This method has been used by the SEC. Griess-Pileger Tanning Co., 5 S. E. C.
72, 79 (1939); La France Industries, 5 S. E. C. 917, 925 (1939).
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in nature. Consequently, the exact effect of their loss upon the creditor's
position cannot be ascertained. Moreover, creditors may be accorded off-
setting compensating factors equally difficult to value. For example, the
allocation of voting control in the new corporation might compensate in
some measure for loss of other rights."; But value attributable to voting
rights is not subject to exact expression in monetary terms.
Thus, the problem of distribution must necessarily be resolved, after analysis
of the sacrifices and gains proposed by the particular plan, in terms of
general fairness rather than the mathematics of "absolute priorities" and
"full compensation." This principle was recognized in Standard Ga( &
Electric Company v. Deep Rock Oil Corporation. There the corporation
was found to be solvent. Secured noteholders having aggregate claims
amounting to $11,950,000 were paid $500,000 in cash, and were given twelve
year notes in the amount of $5,500,000 and common stock having a book
value of $6,510,311. The noteholders were thus given common stock with
a book value of $560,311 in excess of their claims. This was deemed fair
compensation for accepting a junior security for approximately half of their
total claims, and for extension of the maturity of the new notes.
Satisfaction of the requirement that a plan be "fair and equitable" thus
does not necessarily require that prior creditors be given a senior security
for the whole or a part of their claims. The granting of a "quantitative
preference" to creditors- that is, giving them more of the same security
than is allocated to junior interests- is an alternative possibility. 7 Or
the senior creditors might be given the same security at a lower base value. 8
Apparently the SEC had some initial doubt, at least under the Holding
Company Act, as to the fairness of a plan which did not provide some
form of senior securities to satisfy the priorities of creditors or preferred
stockholders where common stockholders were entitled to participate 9 The
Consolidated Rock Products case has in large measure dispelled that doubt.100
The Court there indicated that a plan of reorganization may be upheld as
fair even though the bondholders are given securities of the same grade
95. This could be accomplished either by giving the bondholders an equity interest
in the enterprise or by setting up a voting trust for the benefit of the bondholders. For
a discussion of voting control in reorganization see Krotinger, Manageynent and Allots.
tion of Voting Power in Corporate Reorganizations (1941) 41 COL. L. Rav. 646, 672 ft,
96. 117 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
97. The quantitative preference theory has been accepted in other lower court deci-
sions as meeting standards of fairness. In re Radio-Keith-Orpheumn Corp., 106 F. (2d)
22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); In re Louisiana & N. W. R. R., 36 F. Supp. 636 (S. D. N. Y.
1938); In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763 (N. D. Ill. 1939); In re
Chicago, G. W. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149, 158 (N. D. Ill. 1939).
98. In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 246 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
99. Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C. 483, 520 (1939) (concurring opinion
of Commissioner Healy).
100. See The Commonwealth & Southern Corp., Holding Company Act Release No.
2831, June 20, 1941, pp. 6-7,
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as those allocated to junior interests.""' Consequently, a plan contemplating
the issuance of common stock alone would seem to meet fair and equitable
standards of distribution provided that senior creditors were given a suffi-
cient amount of inferior securities to compensate for their surrendered rights.
Clearly, in such a situation, "absolute" priorities are not preserved to
creditors. Priority in access to income would be lost as well as other sub-
stantial contractual rights, and in the event of future reorganization the
former creditors would find themselves without a prior claim. The adoption
of such one-stock plans, however, should prove highly desirable in many
cases to provide the debtor with a capital structure consonant with its ability
to earn.
10 2
Inasmuch as sacrifices made by senior creditors and the various factors
compensating for such sacrifices are not subject to precise valuation, a thor-
ough appraisal of the scheme of distribution in the light of the facts of the
particular case should be required before a plan is approved as fair. Careful
analysis of the enterprise in its setting is necessary to prevent over-partici-
pation by junior interests at th6 expense of creditors. The right of creditors
to share in earnings under the provisions of the new securities should at
least approximate their old return. 1 3 And if the bondholders are forced to
accept a proprietary interest in whole or in part, greater participation in
estimated earnings should normally be given to offset possible dividend
failures in the future. This could be accomplished by creating a class of
preferred stock or increasing bondholder participation in the distribution
of common under a one-stock plan.
Whether or not the securities issued to prior creditors in the reorgani-
zation of a solvent corporation must immediately attain a market value
equivalent to the total amount of the creditors' claims in order to render
the plan fair is a matter for conjecture. The Consolidated Rock Products
case indicated that securities offered creditors must be "of a value equal
to the creditors' claims."' 0 4 But no reference was made by the Court to
the particular concept of value intended. Several interpretations are possible.
The term value may indicate that the securities offered prior creditors must
immediately sell on the market at a price sufficient to satisfy the aggregate
101. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 528 (1941) where
the court stated: "The absolute priority rule does not mean that bondholders cannot be
given inferior grades of securities, or even securities of the same grade as are received
by junior interests. Requirements of feasibility of reorganization plans frequently necessi-
tate it in the interests of simpler and more conservative capital structures. And standards
of fairness permit it." Cf. Kansas City Term. Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S.
445, 455 (1926).
102. See Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S. E. C. 1, 27 (1940).
103. See In re Chicago G. W. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149, 11 (N. D. II. 1939); McKes-
son and Robbins, Inc., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 41, March 29, 1941, p. 25.
But see In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 246 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
104. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 529-30 (1941).
19411
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
claims of such creditors. On the other hand, it may mean that the securities
need only be of a face value equal to the total face amount of the claims
of the prior creditors, or it may be sufficient if the new securities have a
book value, including surplus, equal to the prior creditors' claims. Lastly,
it may suffice if it appears that the securities of the reorganized corporation
will ultimately reach a value in the market equal to the amount of the
creditors' claims.
It seems unlikely that any blanket market value, face amount, or book
value theory will be adopted as a standard for uniform application in all
cases. But in dealing with fixed interest securities especially, it would seem
necessary to adjust interest rates and other provisions to market conditions
so that the securities would sell at or close to par. The confidence of the
investing public in the debt securities of a reorganized corporation is of
fundamental importance. Moreover, values would be diverted from prior
creditors who were given bonds at par value to satisfy their claims if the
bonds contained provisions which would not permit their ready sale at par
in the market. The management of the corporation might be able to buy
in the bonds at the lower market price and thus improve the stockholders'
relative position in the enterprise at the expense of the bondholders. 105 It
would likewise seem feasible to gauge income bonds, debentures and pre-
ferred stocks in terms of current market conditions. The use of hybrid
securities with deceptive provisions to satisfy the claims of prior creditors
is clearly forbidden under the Holding Company Act' 00 and under Chapter
X.107 Consequently, questionable securities of this type should be analyzed
with reference to market conditions to prevent discrimination against such
creditors.' 08
The SEC has indicated its acceptance of the market value test in at least
one case. In the reorganization of McKesson and Robbins, Incorporated, 0
a solvent corporafion, the Commission approved a plan whereby prior
creditors were to receive for their matured, unsecured debts 40% in cash,
40% in new 4% debentures, and 20% in new 5Y27% preferred stock. The
plan required a sacrifice of creditor status to the extent of 20% of their
claims, a 15-year extension of maturity on 40% of their claims, and a
reduction in average rate of return of approximately 1%. The SEC approved
this treatment inasmuch as testimony indicated that similar bonds and pre-
ferred stocks bearing interest rates comparable with those proposed could
be sold at par under then current market conditions. The treatment accorded
105. See Atlas Pipeline Corp., Corporate Reorganization Release No, 42, June 7,
1941, p. 27. Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S. E. C. 1, 21 (1940); cf. Penn Timber Co.,
4 S. E. C. 630, 642 (1939).
106. 48 STAT. 816 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79g(c) (1) (Supp. 1939).
107. Section 216(12).
108. See Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., 5 S. E. C. 72, 82-4 (1939).
109. Corporate Reorganizationl Release No, 41, March 29, 1941, pp. 23-24.
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the creditors would thus enable them to realize cash equivalent to the total
amount of their claims. If market conditions changed by the time of cion-
firmation of the plan, however, the Commission stated that changes would
be required to insure creditors receipt of a cash equivalent for their claims.
Whether or not common stocks issued in reorganization can similarly be
measured in terms of market values is questionable. The sensitivity of the
speculative securities market to external factors unrelated to the condition
of a particular enterprise would tend to make the test unreliable. The
current market value for speculative securities would have little relation to
earnings but would rather reflect the psychological state of the investing
public. It would thus seem an extremely difficult undertaking to warrant
a selling price for the common stocks of reorganized corporations. The values
attributable to common stocks for purposes of reorganization would probably
prove fairer if related to the estimated book value of the company based ulpon
its capitalized future earnings. If capitalization is based solely upon pros-
pective earnings, the amount of the common shareholders' equity on the
books should constitute a fair test of value. Thus where bondholders are
given a portion of their claims in common stock, the book value of each
share in relation to the going concern value of the whole enterprise should
be computed. If the book value behind the common stock issued to bond-
holders, together with other securities allocated to them, is equal to the
face amount or discounted income value of their claims, standards of fair-
ness would be met. 10
The ICC has emphasized the, importance of the face amount of new
securities in measuring the "fullness" of compensation in railroad reorgani-
zations. 11 In the reorganization of the solvent Erie Railroad Company,
211-
the Conmission approved a plan which distributed to refunding bondholders
having a total claim of $111,041,667, new fixed interest bonds, income bunds
and preferred stock having an aggregate face value of $36,500,C00. For
the balance of their claim, amounting to $74,541,667, the bundholders were
allotted 2,005,605 shares of common stock. Thus one share of common
stock was allotted to bondholders at a value representing $37.17 of their
total claim. Unsecured creditors were given common stock on the basis
of one share for each $40 of claim. The old preferred and common share-
holders received new common at a base value of $52.22 per share. In con-
firming this plan of distribution the district court stated that the plan thus
110. The SEC has placed great emphasis on the book value, based upon prospective
earnings, behind common stocks in determining whether plans of distribution conform
to standards of fairness. See McKesson and Robbins, Inc., Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 41, 'March 29, 1941, pp. 24-5; cf. La France Industries, 5 S. E. C. 917, 930-
32 (1939).
111. Friendly and Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities it Railread Rcor-
ganizations under Section 77 (1940) 7 LAw & CimITEMP. Pnou. 421).
112. 239 I. C. C. 653 (1940). The Conmmissikn approved plan has been confin d by
the district court. In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237 (N. D. Ohiu 1940).
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recognized the entire claim of refunding bondholders in some form of new
securities before junior interests were permitted to participate. The court
further indicated that "there is no requirement as a matter of law . . .
that new securities issued in a reorganization will immediately . . . attain
a market value equivalent to the face amount of the claim which they repre-
sent, before junior security-holders may participate."' 113
The fairness of this allocation is open to question. Whether or not the
refunding bondholders were accorded full compensation for their claims and
the loss of substantial rights would depend in large measure upon the "value"
attributable to the common stock. If there is no earning power back of
the common stock, estimated future earnings being barely sufficient to cover
fixed charges, the securities would be of only ephemeral value. The Erie
appears to have been over capitalized in terms of prospective earning power.
The court did indicate, however, that some earnings could be predicted for
distribution to new common shareholders. 14 But the estimated amount of
such earnings and whether or not they would be likely to give the stock
a book value of $37.17 per share was not determined. A more thorough
appraisal would seem to be required before an informed judgment on the
fairness of the plan of distribution could be exercised. Although the Con-
solidated Rock Products case does not imply that the "face amount" theory
should be discarded entirely, it does indicate that a thorough analysis of
the creditor's position in the reorganized enterprise should be made upon
a more substantial basis than reference to stated values given the new
securities.1
5
The Consolidated Rock Products case indicates that the valuation of
creditors' claims will hinge on the type of disposition to be made of the
debtor's assets. If liquidation is contemplated, then contractual priorities
conditioned upon that event must be recognized in full. If the financial
prospects of the debtor justify its rehabilitation, then equally fair recog-
nition must be given to the rights and privileges of the creditors incident
to the continued operation of the enterprise. Recognition of creditors' prior-
ities does not mean according them their liquidation rights where no liquida-
tion is contemplated, but rather recognition of their contractual rights in
the debtor corporation as a going concern." 6
113. In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 246 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
114. Ibid.
115. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 528-9 (1941).
.. while creditors may be given inferior grades of securities, their 'superior rights'
must be recognized. Clearly, those prior rights are not recognized, in cases where stock-
holders are participating in the plan, if creditors arc given only a face amount of in-
ferior securities equal to the face amount of their claims."
116. The SEC has expressed similar views. In Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co,,
7 S. E. C. 456, 532 (1940), the Commission stated: "It may be correct to state, in the
case of liquidation, that each class of creditors owns that portion of the property which
represents the proceeds it will realize upon distribution, since the cash will immedlately
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Insistence upon valuing the contractual rights of creditors on a going
concern basis poses the problem of allocation as between classes of stock
having different priority rights conditioned upon liquidation. The motivation
of courts with respect to the priority of preferred stock, assured by contract,
has generally been to protect those contractual rights vis a ,is common in
every circumstance of corporate history. Lower federal courts and the SEC
have apparently assumed that in reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act
a preferred stock having a stated liquidation priority over common must
be accorded participation to the extent of its liquidation value, even where
rehabilitation rather than liquidation is contemplated. 1 7 Under this analysis,
preferred stockholders are entitled to a participation equivalent at least to
arrearages in dividends, if any, plus stated liquidation value before common
stockholders may be included.
Under the simplification provisions of Sections 6 and 7 and Section 11
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,-' however, the SEC has adopted
a contrary position."10 That Act contemplates, inter alia. the elimination of
unnecessary complexity in the security structures of holding companies,
primarily with a view to eliminating preferred stock issues and insuring an
equitable distribution of voting control in the enterprise.2" To accomplish
these purposes, the Commission is given power to compel simplification,1 '
but managements may submit voluntary plans to effect the same result prior
to independent Commission action.12- A proposed plan, whether voluntary
or involuntary, must be "fair and equitable to the persons affected by such
plan" 123 in order to obtain Commission approval. Inasmuch as the condi-
tion of the company warranted issuance of a simplification order by the
be paid to it. But a similar statement cannot be correctly made with respect to the gring
concern values which are allocable to secured and unsecured creditors for purposes of
reorganization. Those values represent the reasonably estimated present worth of the
amounts which could be realized by each class of securities from the continuation of Mhe
enterprise if their respective claims were contiued." (Italics supplied).
117. In rc Utilities Power & Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763 (N. D. 11. 1939); In re
National Food Prod. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 979 (D. Md. 1938); McKesson and Robbins,
Inc., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 41, March 29, 1941, p. 24.
118. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1939). Hereafter the Act will be
cited by section only.
119. Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2635, March
24, 1941, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1410; cf. Community Power & Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 182
(1939), (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1297; see Derby Gas & Elect. Corp., Holding Company
Act Release No. 2875, July 12, 1941, p. 18. The plan approved by tie SEC in the Com-
munity Power release has been affirmed. In re Community Power & Light Co., 33 F.
Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
120. See Afeck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Managemcnt undcr
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 216.
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Commission under Section 11(b)(2),124 the Federal Water Service Cor-
poration submitted a voluntary plan of simplification under Section 7 of
the Act.12 It had a security structure consisting of debentures, preferred
stock, and Class A and Class B common stocks. Under the proposed plan
of recapitalization, the preferred stock was eliminated and preferred share-
holders were given approximately 95% of the new common stock. Class A
common received approximately 5% of the new common and Class B comt-
mon was eliminated.120  It appeared, although no valuation of assets was
attempted, that the old book value of Federal's assets was insufficient to
meet even the stated liquidation value of the preferred stock. Moreover,
the preferred had outstanding dividend arrearages of $9,260,138, an amount
equal to more than one-half the stated value of the shares. Prospective earn-
ings appeared sufficient to meet interest requirements on the debenttres,
and to reduce gradually the accrued dividends on the preferred stock.Y-
Consequently, assuming relatively constant earnings, the Class A stockholders
could look forward to some return on their shares as soon as the preferred
arrearages were eliminated. The Commission admitted that no dividends
could be paid to Class A shareholders for many years.128 In view of the
fact that the Class A stock had a reasonable prospect of participating in
earnings at some indeterminable future time, the majority of the Commission
held the plan allocating 5% of the new common to Class A fair within the"
meaning of the Act.1 2 In reaching this result, it refused to analogize the
124. 42.73% of the total voting power was in the hands of stockholders whose securi-
ties had no book value whatever. The corporate structure was also unnecessarily com-
plicated.
125. Holding Company Act Release No. 2635, March 24, 1941 (Commissioner Healy
dissenting). The management submitted the plan under § 7 presumably because of its
less stringent requirements. Under §7(d)(6) the SEC may approve a plan if it is
deemed not "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors", which is ap-
parently less strict than the "fair and equitable" test of § 11 (e). The SEC determined,
however, that its judgment on the plan would be the same whether considered under
§7 or under § 11(e).
126. Outstanding debentures were not disturbed under the plan.
127. It is doubtful whether current earnings would have justified this assumption. The
majority of the Commission "reasonably" expected an increased flow of earnings from
subsidiaries to Federal through elimination of the deficit in Federal's capital account, a
factor which had made illegal the payment of dividends and had reduced the incentive
of the management to draw up earnings, and also through removal of construction needs
and preferred arrearages in the subsidiaries, which had obstructed the free flow of earn-
ings. No precise estimatc of prospective earnings was made by the majority.
128. Assuming that the consolidated earnings should hold to the 1941 level and that
the entire consolidated earnings of the system could be made to flow up to Federal's
stockholders, the majority estimated that arrearages on preferred could be paid off in
eleven years. Basing his assumption on average earnings for five years, Commissioner
Healy in his dissent estimated that it would take twenty-eight years to retire preferred
arrearages and provide the common with a right to participate in earnings.
129. The final allocation of shares to old common stockholders approximated 6%.
Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 3023, September 25,
1941, p. 4.
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situation arising under the simplification provisions of the Holding Company
Act to that involved in bankruptcy reorganization and consequently, it declined
to impute to the words "fair and equitable" in the Holding Company Act
the meaning attributed to those same "words of art" in Case z,. Los Andcles
Lumber Products Cornpany. 30 The majority reasoned that "bankruptcy
reorganizations are in substance liquidations ol a going concern basis."'
a
Hence, according to the Commission, liquidation priorities should detennine
the value of preferred stock claims under Chapter X since the threat of
liquidation was there imminent. On the other hand, in the simplification
of security structures under the Holding Company Act, the majority argued
that corporations involved would probably not be insolvent in either the
equity or in the bankruptcy sense. Liquidation was not deemed "in the
air" in recapitalization proceedings arising under the Holding Company
Act'13 2 and hence absolute liquidation priorities should not be held coln-
trolling in measuring the preferred claim.
The Water Servaice case is thus premised on the theory that nto valuation
of a corporation's assets is necessary in determining the extent of partici-
pation to be accorded preferred as against common stockholders in recapi-
talization proceedings under the Holding Company Act. This view is in
direct conflict with the Supreme Court's condemnation of the plan submitted
in the Consolidated Rock Products case on the ground that no attempt had
there been made to value the whole enterprise by a capitalization of the
prospective earnings. 3 3 No reason is apparent why the approach in judging
the fairness of plans should differ, whether such plans contemplate read-
justnent by charter amnendment, by recapitalization under the Holding Com-
pany Act. by merger, consolidation, or sale of assets, or ly reorganization
in bankruptcy. The same issue is presented in all such cases, namely, adjust-
ing the security structure of the enterprise to its earnings and the value of
its assets. The same impulse of courts to protect contractual rights should
be operative in each proceeding. In each, there is available for distribution
to security holders only the value of the assets of the particular corporation
or corporations concerned. Solution of the initial problem of determining
what is available for distribution requires a valuation of the total assets-
a revision of the asset side of the balance sheet. The capitalized prospective
130. 308 U. S. 106 (1939).
131. Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 20s35, March
24, 1941, p. 15.
132. The majority stated that if liquidation were contemplated under §11(b)(2),
full recognition would have to be accorded the liquidation preference of the preferred
shareholders in order to satisfy the requirements of the absolute priority rule.
133. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 525 (1941). The Court
stated: "From this record it is apparent that little, if any, effort was made to value the
whole enterprise by a capitalization of prospective earnings . . . Findings as to the earn-
ing capacity of an enterprise are essential to a determination of . . . the fairness of a
plan of reorganization."
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earnings of the enterprise are the proper determinant of this "enterprise-
as-a-whole" value' Solution of the second problem of how the total value
should be distributed requires valuation of claims of classes of securities-
a determination of the liability side of the balance sheet. In the Water Service
case neither of these basic determinations was made. Consequently, it stands
opposed to the method for achieving fairness prescribed by the Consolidated
Rock Products decision.
The Water Service case raises a second question, namely, whether the
interest of a preferred stockholder in a continuing enterprise should be
measured by the going concern value of the stock, by its par or stated value,
or by its liquidation value where the latter figure differs from par or stated
value. The Commission deemed the values which measure claims on liquida-
tion inconclusive and implied that for purposes of recapitalization the pre-
ferred stock interest should be valued on a going concern basis. But even
if the fairness of the latter theory be conceded, objection can be raised to
its adoption where, as in the Water Service case, only a vague and indecisive
inquiry is made into average annual earnings anticipated without a precise
finding of total enterprise value based upon capitalized prospective earnings.
Under this procedure, it would be impossible to arrive at any precise valtia-
tion of the common stock equity where arrearages have accumulated on
the preferred stock. 34 Consequently, the use of this approach in allocating
shares between preferred and common shareholders would probably result
in handing out a percentage of the new common to old common stockholders
oin a discretionary basis.
The Water Service case may, however, presage a change in the method
of valuing preferred and common stock equities in reorganization. For aside
from its justification of the failure to make a precise value determination,
the chief difficulty with the majority's rationale lies not in its going concern
theory of valuing these interests, but rather in its attempted distinction
between what it termed the liquidation-filled "atmosphere" of equity and
bankruptcy reorganizations and the simplification provisions of the Holding
Company Act.135 No substantial reasons of policy are apparent for adopting
different theories of value in these two situations; from a functional stand-
point, reorganization cannot be spoken of as intimately bound up with liquida-
134. This was the primary reason given by the Commission for its failure to make a
precise valuation of the common stock equity. Federal Water Service Corp., Holding
Company Act Release No. 2635, March 24, 1941, p. 13.'
135. See Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2635,
March 24, 1941, p. 15. This dichotomy set up by the Commission seems highly fictional.
The threat of liquidation in the equity receivership is doubtful. The typical equity pro-
ceeding might be resorted to by corporations no worse situated than Federal. The equity
receivership was created by the courts as a device to prevent dismemberment of the
corporation by creditors. FINLETER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTcY REORGANIZATION (1939)
1, 2. Once the Chancellor took jurisdiction to avert liquidation, then liquidation was no
longer imminent.
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tion where no liquidation occurs or, as in the case of a utility corporation,
where liquidation cannot easily occur. No "atmosphere of liquidation" is
present once it is determined that the financial prospects of the debtor justify
its rehabilitation. To base a distinction upon this ground attaches greater
importance to procedural form and historical connotation than to actual
function and result.136 Consequently, whichever theory of value is ultimately
adopted, it should apply with equal facility to cases where debtor corpora-
tions are rehabilitated in bankruptcy reorganization as well as to recapitaliza-
tion proceedings under the Holding Company Act.
The problem of valuing the preferred stock interest in reorganization
should be viewed in terms of these questions: Which theory will provide
the fairest adjustment between the rights of stockholders, and Will that
theory prove workable in practice? It can logically be argued as a matter
of contract that once the possibility of liquidation has been rejected in reoir-
ganization, the contractual rights conditioned upon the happening of that
event should not control in determining the distribution of securities in thp
reorganized concern. The preference status of preferred stock is generally
a matter of contract in relation to the common stock alone.137 Liquidation
preference is a single legal right anong the aggregate of contractual priorities
of the class of preferred stock. Where liquidation may occur, if ever, only
in the future, the present value of the liquidation preference cannot equal
its face amount. Thus it should not be adopted as the pecuniary measure
of the preferred stock interest. Par value is another possible measure of
the interest of the preferred class. But preferred shares do not constitute
a debt of the corporation which it is obligated to pay. Moreover, stated
par value, standing alone, has little relation to the income claim of the
preferred class. Also, no-par preferred shares are widely used in modern
financing. Consequently, the adoption of a par value test would not seem
to guarantee a fair distribution of total enterprise value to the preferred
class nor accord a fair participation to the common stockholders.
The third possible test, consistent with the going concern theory of valuing
creditors' claims established in the Consolidated Roc Products decision,
results from a translation of the going concern theory of valuing preferred
136. To look to the archaic form of the equity reorganization, rather than to its func-
tion and result, is to make a distinction in law without a distinction in policy, and to
ignore realities which the equity courts openly recognized. "It rarely happens in the
United States that foreclosures of railway mortgages are anything else than the machin-
ery by which arrangements between the creditors and other parties in interest are car-
ried into effect, and a reorganization of the affairs of the corporation under a new name
brought about." Canada So. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 539 (18,M). "Because its
purpose was reorganization, not liquidation, the substance of the action was far removed
from its traditional uses, but its form remained the same." SEC RrErr, (1I0) Pt.
VIII p. 25.
137. See 11 FLETCuER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (perm. ed.) §5290; DnwuvoC,
THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1934) 43.
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stock interests - the test implied by the Commission in the [Vater Service
case -into the accepted judicial technique for determining values in bank-
ruptcy reorganization. Thus a precise determination of the going concern
value of the whole enterprise on a basis of capitalized prospective earnings
would constitute the initial step. Assuming three classes of security holders,
deduction from this figure of the value of bondholders' claims would leave
the amount available for distribution to preferred and common stockholders.
The problem then becomes one of determining how much the preferred
stockholders are entitled to receive before common stockholders may be
included in the plan. The going concern theory advocated in the W1ater
Service case may be achieved by capitalizing the total annual preferred divi-
dend requirement at the same rate used in capitalizing the enterprise as
a whole.138 The resulting figure would represent the "principal amount"
of the preferred stockholders' claim and, if dividend arrearages were added
to this base figure, would constitute a minimum "fair" allocation to the
preferred stockholders. If the value of the total preferred interest thus
derived is equal to or greater than the asset values available for distribution,
common stockholders would not be entitled to participate. But if the total
preferred interest is less than the amount available for distribution, it does
not necessarily follow that common will participate. For, if one class of
new common stock is proposed for distribution to both classes of share-
holders, the preferred should be compensated for the loss of priority in access
to income and for the present value of their sacrificed liquidation preference.
To illustrate this theory, suppose that in a corporation capitalized at a
rate of 10% the total amount of going concern value after satisfaction of
the bondholders' claim is $1,500,000, and that it is proposed to issue new
common stock for this amount. Suppose also that 10,000 shares of $100
par value preferred are outstanding, having a liquidation preference of $110
per share and priority in access to income of $7 per share over the common.
Assumed arrears on the preferred amount to $500,000. If liquidation values
were taken as the measure of preferred participation, common stockholders
would be eliminated, since the total liquidation value of the preferred,
$1,100,000, plus the arrearages, $500,000, would exceed the $1,500,000 total
available for distribution. A similar result would follow if par value were
taken as the criterion of the preferred interest - $1,000,000 par plus $500,000
in arrearages would exactly equal the $1,500,000 asset values. If the going
concern theory were adopted, however, the total annual preferred dividend
requirement would be capitalized at a rate of 10%, giving $700,000 as the
138. The use of this rate of capitalization is not for the purpose of valuing the pre-
ferred stock interest in terms of risk. The risk value of preferred necessarily varies with
its relative position in the security structure. But given the rate of capitalization for the
whole in addition to predicted earnings, the suggested process only translates the pre-
ferred dividend requirement into a value of the same level as that derived by capital-
izing the enterprise as a whole.
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"'principal amount" of the preferred shares. Adding the arrears of $500,000,
the total preferred interest of $1,200,000 would probably leave some par-
ticipation for the common even if the sacrifice in status by the preferred
compelled greater participation as compensation therefor. If the capitali-
zation rate and the predicted average annual earnings for the enterprise
are approximately correct, 130 the preferred should still receive their $7 return.
This theory would seem to provide a fairer basis for apportioning participa-
tion between preferred and common shareholders than either liquidation or
par value. If, in the case posed above, the interest of the preferred were
valued by the liquidation right of $110 per share and the capitalization rate of
10% for the enterprise as a whole were correct, they would theoretically
receive a return of $11 per share on old preferred after reorganization. This
would seem extremely high compensation for their change in status when
common shareholders are eliminated from the plan.
CONCLUSION
Recent emphasis in reorganization has increasingly centered on the
creation of enterprises soundly financed in the light of available economic
data. Although the absolute priority rule has become firmly established
as the guiding standard in determining which classes of claimants will par-
ticipate, it has been supplanted by general considerations of "fairness" in
the distribution of reorganization securities. The opportunity for financing
corporations in reorganization solely through equity securities has thus been
provided and should be utilized. In determining whether compensatory
features in the treatment of prior interests are fair and equitable, much will
depend on the informed discretion of the trial court. The prerequisite fur
achieving fairness, emphasized by the Consolidated Rock Products decision,
is a thorough appraisal of reorganization securities, and their allocation,
after analysis of the debtor's economic status. Without this basic investi-
gation, values may be diverted from senior to junior interests while lip
service is paid to the requirement of "full" compensation.
139. These are basic assumptions in the entire valuation procedure adopted by the
Commission under Chapter X, and the importance of their approximate correctness is
not confined to the particular problem of valuing the preferred stock claim.
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